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Workplaces in the primary economy and wage pressure in the
secondary labor market
Abstract
This paper develops a two-sector general-equilibrium model in which firms in the primary economy
have to create workplaces prior to production and product market competition. For this, we introduce
the endogenous sunk-cost approach with two-stage decisions of firms from IO in the macro labor
literature. By hypothesizing that technological change has lowered marginal costs but has raised
nonproduction requirements for providing workplaces, we are able to explain downsizing of low-skilled
jobs in the primary economy despite wage flexibility exante. This leads to more accentuated
labor-market segmentation, i.e., an increase in wage pressure in the secondary economy.
523
Workplaces in the Primary Economy and Wage
Pressure in the Secondary Labor Market
by
JOSEF FALKINGER AND VOLKER GROSSMANN ∗
This paper develops a two-sector general-equilibrium model in which ﬁrms in
the primary economy have to create workplaces prior to production and product-
market competition. For this, we introduce the endogenous sunk-cost approach
with two-stage decisions of ﬁrms from IO in the macro labor literature. By hy-
pothesizing that technological change has lowered marginal costs but has raised
nonproduction requirements for providing workplaces, we are able to explain
downsizing of low-skilled jobs in the primary economy despite wage ﬂexibility ex
ante. This leads to more accentuated labor-market segmentation, i.e., an increase
in wage pressure in the secondary economy. (JEL: D 20, J 31)
1 Introduction
The goal of the present paper is to propose a general equilibrium model with dual
labor markets that allows us to identify economic (rather than institutional) causes
of downsizing of low-skilled jobs in the primary economy, implying a higher wage
pressure in the secondary economy.
In the last years, an extensive literature on the relationship between wage in-
equality and technological change has been developed (e.g., GREGG AND MANNING
[1997],GALOR AND TSIDDON [1997],ACEMOGLU [1998],CASELLI [1999], LLOYD-
ELLIS [1999], GALOR AND MOAV [2000]). This literature largely focuses on shifts
in relative labor productivity in favor of skilled workers, i.e., on the hypothesis of
so-called skill-biased technological change. However, increasing wage inequality is
not the only symptom of declining demand for low-skilled labor, and is largely con-
ﬁned to the U.S. and the U.K. (e.g., GOTTSCHALK AND SMEEDING [1997]). A more
pervasive characteristic is that low-skilled jobs in manufacturing industries have
∗ We are grateful to Johannes Binswanger, Jim Malley, and two anonymous refer-
ees for valuable comments and to Armin Bänziger for excellent research assistence.
Moreover, we are indebted for helpful discussions and comments to Dennis Snower
and to seminar participants at the University of Zurich; the CESifo workshop on “Em-
ployment and Social Protection” in Munich, 2001; and the European Economic Asso-
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(ESEM), both held in Lausanne, 2001.
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been downsized substantially over the last two decades in both Anglo-American
countries and continental Europe (e.g., BERMAN, BOUND, AND MACHIN [1998],
MACHIN AND VAN REENEN [1998]). In the relatively rigid European labor mar-
kets, this has led to dramatic increases in unemployment rates for low-skilled labor.
Thus, economists and policymakers more and more stress the need to create low-
paid jobs in the service sector, for instance, by lowering minimum wages. In the
U.S., real wages at the bottom have already declined sharply in the last decades
(FORTIN AND LEMIEUX [1997], MURPHY AND TOPEL [1997]). In combination with
a considerably larger service sector in the U.S. than in, say, Germany, this seems
to have helped the U.S. economy to avoid the unemployment problems now faced
by continental Europe.1 This suggests that opening up the secondary labor market
may be a successful strategy to reduce unemployment – but at two kinds of costs:
ﬁrst, a more substantial dualization of the labor market for low-skilled workers,
with well-paid jobs in the primary economy and low-paid jobs in the secondary
economy; and second, higher overall wage inequality, coming from job rationing
in the primary sector rather than from rising wage differentials between skilled and
unskilled workers in the primary sector.2
We hypothesize that the main difference between the primary and the secondary
economy is technological (for instance, due to the different nature of goods pro-
duced in these sectors). The primary economy is characterized by ﬁrms with an
organizational infrastructure in which workers can interact. Thus, a crucial feature
of our model is that ﬁrms in the primary economy have to create workplaces prior
to production and product-market competition. This is formalized by introducing
the idea of endogenous sunk costs for capacity investments of ﬁrms from the IO
literature in a macro labor context.3 More precisely, ﬁrms in the primary economy
choose their number of (high-skilled and low-skilled) workplaces at a ﬁrst stage
before entering monopolistic competition in a second stage. As known from the IO
literature, such a two-stage framework is natural whenever capacity choices of ﬁrms
are involved. In a macro labor context, it enables us to take the idea of a workplace
seriously. By contrast, no ex ante creation of workplaces is needed in the secondary
1 According to OECD [2000], in 1998 the total share of service employment was
73.8 percent in the U.S. and 62.6 percent in Germany. The respective employment
shares of personal services (which are characterized by particularly low-paid jobs, on
average) are 12.1 compared to 7.1 percent.
2 It should be noted that this view is rather different from the now famous Krugman
hypothesis (KRUGMAN [1994]), which deals with an overall trade-off between wage
inequality and unemployment due to wage differentials in a single-sector framework.
3 See SUTTON [1991], [1998] for a general account of the theory of endogenous
sunk costs, which is necessarily characterized by two-stage games among ﬁrms in
IO contexts, with subgame-perfect equilibria. We adopt this approach to a general-
equilibrium model by seeking perfect-foresight equilibria without strategic interac-
tions. FALKINGER [2002] presents a systematic analysis of the macroeconomic con-
sequences of internal organization of work in a two-stage monopolistic competition
model. However, no dual economy is considered.
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labor market. Those workers for whom no primary jobs are organized offer their
labor to the secondary economy.
The endogenous sunk costs for the creation ofworkplaces in the primary economy
are speciﬁed as wage costs for high-skilled nonproduction labor like that of man-
agers, where managerial requirements and workplace creation are linked according
to a linear homogeneous technology. A ﬁrst analysis of this idea has been provided
in FALKINGER AND GROSSMANN [2001]. However, only a one-sector framework
has been considered, which does not allow us to address labor-market segmentation.
Moreover, it has been assumed that only low-skilled jobs have to be organized.
In a comparative-static analysis we show how changes in this organization tech-
nology affectmacroeconomic variables. Our hypothesis is that the cost of organizing
work has increased, in the effort to achieve lower marginal production costs. This
is motivated by the observation that the employment share of workers in manage-
rial occupations has substantially increased in the last two decades (see BERMAN,
BOUND, AND GRICHILIS [1994], among others). One reason is the increased require-
ments for human-resource management. Another reason may be more sophisticated
marketing methods. In particular, new information and communication technologies
(ITCs) have led to new demand for high-skilled nonproduction labor. A growing
empirical literature on the complementarity between ITC and new forms of the
organization of production (raising the demand for managerial skills) dismisses the
earlier view of a direct complementarity of ITC and the human capital of computer
users.4 As stated by BRYNJOLFFSON AND HITT [2000, p. 24], “the business value
of computers is limited less by computational capability and more by the ability of
managers to invent new processes, procedures and organizational structures.” Efﬁ-
ciency gains of computerization are twofold. On the one hand, repetitive tasks of
low-wage white-collar workers in bureaucracies have been “regularised, routinised,
and standardised” (BRESNAHAN [1999, p. F403]). On the other hand, large opera-
tional databases are available and await exploitation. “Managers and professionals
do more research as a result, and turn their results into operations more systemati-
cally” (p. F409). For instance, customer databases allow ﬁrms to target marketing
campaigns more effectively to consumers and to design products that better meet
customers’ needs (SHAPIRO AND VARIAN [1999]). Moreover, decreases in infor-
mation and communication costs allow decentralization of decision-making and
other forms of ﬂexible work practices. But this requires organizational learning of
workers and thus implies increased demand for human-resource managers (OECD
[1999]). These developments justify our hypothesis that organizational setup costs
have indeed increased, a possibility that has so far been neglected in the literature
4 The standard notion of skill-biased technological change has been strongly crit-
icized in that computer use has not been found to affect wages at the individual
level (DINARDO AND PISCHKE [1997]). Rather, as pointed out by BRESNAHAN [1999,
p. F402], the hypothesis of a skill complementarity of computer use “misses all
the highly skilled managers who do not literally use a computer (perhaps getting
a computer-based report from a subordinate) but whose skills are highly comple-
mented by the computerisation of the organisation”.
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Table 1
Employment Shares of White-Collar Workers by Tasks
in U.S. Manufacturing and Producer Services (in percent)
Manufacturing Producer services
Adminis- Man- Profes- Adminis- Man- Profes-
Year trators agers sionals trators agers sionals
1983 12.8 11.3 8.9 35.1 23.2 9.6
1989 10.4 11.9 9.0 30.2 26.4 11.0
1995 9.8 14.6 9.5 25.1 26.9 13.5
2000 9.1 15.8 10.7 19.5 29.3 15.6
Data Source: Current Population Survey (CPS). Refers to full-time workers aged 19–65.
on shifts in relative labor demand. In fact, Table 1 shows that the employment
share of managers and professionals has substantially risen, whereas the share of
administrative workers in U.S. manufacturing and the producer service sector has
decreased in the last two decades. For instance, in manufacturing, the combined
share of managers and professionals increased by 6.3 percentage points between
1983 and 2000, from 20.3 to 26.6 percent; in producer services, it increased by as
much as 12.1 percentage points in this period.
We ﬁnd that, despite ﬂexible wages, increased organizational requirements lead to
downsizing of low-skilled jobs in the primary economy in a perfect-foresight equi-
librium. In the absence of the usually considered biased changes in the production
technology, this leads to a more compressed wage structure between skill groups in
the primary sector, but to increased wage pressure in the secondary sector. Under
ﬂexible wages (the U.S. case), this results in higher wage differentiation within the
group of low-skilled workers across sectors. Consequently, overall wage inequal-
ity between skill groups may increase despite wage compression in the primary
economy. With a minimum wage, unemployment of low-skilled labor increases, but
wage inequality declines.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy discusses the related litera-
ture. Section 3 presents the basic structure of the economy. Section 4 derives the
equilibrium in the primary economy, and Section 5 closes the model by analyzing
the equilibrium in the secondary labor market. The last section concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our analysis is related to the literature on segregation, labor-market dualization,
and organizational change. Segregation of workers can mean that ﬁrms consist
of relatively homogeneous groups with respect to skill levels (KREMER [1993],
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KREMER AND MASKIN [1996], SAINT-PAUL [2001]). Whereas in this assortative
matching literature similar-skilled workers receive the same wages whether working
in homogeneous or in heterogenous groups, in ourmodel some (low-skilled)workers
become increasingly marginalized in a segmented labor market.
For instance, ﬁrm-size wage differentials (controlling for all individually observ-
able characteristics of workers) have been attributed to the complexity of the ﬁrm
organization (ABOWD, KRAMARZ, AND MARGOLIS [1999]). Moreover, using Swiss
data, RAMIREZ [2000] ﬁnds that the share of skilled, white-collar workers within
a ﬁrm (which, in line with our model, is used as proxy for a ﬁrm’s organizational
complexity) positively affects wages. Thus, it is plausible to hypothesize that the
primary and the secondary labor market differ in the organization of ﬁrms, with
more complex ﬁrms paying higher wages. This is exactly what our model predicts.
As in the story suggested by ABOWD, KRAMARZ, AND MARGOLIS [1999] to explain
employer-size wage differentials, high-paying ﬁrms have market power. However,
in contrast to their story, in our model equilibrium proﬁts are zero and their is no
rent sharing by employers with workers. In our model, market power is implied by
the costs of installing workplaces ex ante, which are ﬁxed costs ex post (i.e., at the
production stage).5
Other dual-labor-market models that attempt to explain the decline of (relative)
earning opportunities for low-skilled labor rely on the notion of so-called skill-
biased technological change, i.e., a biased shift in the relative productivity towards
high-skilled workers. AGENOR AND AIZENMAN [1997] study the impact of biased
technology shocks on the structure ofwageswhen sectorial differences inmonitoring
technologies (and thus in efﬁciency wages) lead to a segmentation into primary and
secondary jobs.As in ourmodel, this implies job rationing in the sense of involuntary
nonemployment in the primary labor market. (See also SAINT-PAUL [1996a] for an
extensive study of labor-market segmentation in the presence of efﬁciency wage
payments.) By contrast, in our model the primary and secondary labor market differ
in the need to organize workplaces. Thus, we provide a different source of job
rationing in the primary economy, related to the necessity to create workplaces ex
ante. SAINT-PAUL [1996b] analyzes a search model with only high-skilled labor in
the primary labor market and only low-skilled labor in the secondary labor market.6
Skill-biased technological change reduces the employment of low-skilled labor, as
ﬁrms have a higher incentive to wait for more productive, high-skilled workers.
This incentive is stronger when more high-skilled workers are available. In our
model, low-skilled workers can also be employed in the primary labor market, and
high-skilled and low-skilled labor are technological complements in production.
Moreover, we analyze a general-equilibrium model that emphasizes the structure
5 For an alternative theory on size–wage differentials, focusing on coordination fail-
ures with search in both the product and the labor market, see SHI [2002].
6 Recently, GAUTIER [2002] has extended this framework of SAINT-PAUL [1996b]
by allowing for free entry of vacancies and the possibility for high-skilled workers to
occupy simple jobs.
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of goods demand. In contrast, the analysis of SAINT-PAUL [1996a], [1996b] is par-
tial-equilibrium.
Finally, there is a small theoretical literature on organizational change and the
distribution of earnings. LINDBECK AND SNOWER [1996], [2000] argue that de-
creases in information and communication costs make ﬂexible work practices like
multitasking more attractive for ﬁrms, thereby increasing the demand for versatile
workers with interactive abilities. However, they do not reﬂect the evidence that such
organizational change also requires organizational learning of workers and support
by human-resource management and other qualiﬁed services providing the infra-
structure for the new work practices. A positive link between increases in qualiﬁed
nonproduction services and wage inequality has been established in GROSSMANN
[2000], THESMAR AND THOENIG [2001], and NAHUIS AND SMULDERS [2002].
These papers study the interactions between the innovation rate, wage inequality,
and the allocation of skilled workers to production-related tasks and to productivity-
enhancing nonproduction ones, respectively. However, there is no dual labor market
in these models, and the focus is on the wage distribution rather than on downsizing
of low-skilled labor and the provision of workplaces in the primary economy.
3 The Structure of the Dual Economy
There are two sectors in the economy: a so-called x-sector with (an exogenous
number of) n ﬁrms, which produces a differentiated good, and a y-sector with a rep-
resentative ﬁrm, which produces a homogeneous good. In both sectors, labor is the
only input, and ﬁrms take wages as given in their employment decisions. Tech-
nologically, the sectors differ in two characteristics. First, whereas in the x-sector
the production process and thus employment require organization in ﬁrms (e.g.,
WEITZMAN [1982]), in the y-sector no organization of work is required. Second,
whereas the x-sector employs both high-skilled and low-skilled labor, low-skilled
labor is the only input in the y-sector. These characteristics are supposed to represent
crucial technological features of the primary economy (x-sector) and the secondary
economy (y-sector). Examples of ﬁrms in the x-sector are General Motors and IBM.
Such ﬁrms are characterized by complex organizational structures, high degree of
interaction among employees, and a substantial share of high-skilled workers. An
extreme example of the secondary labor market is self-employment of low-skilled
workers. Realistically, one may also think of (low-paid) services like cleaning or
newspaper selling as activities in the y-sector, in that they barely involve interaction
among employees.
The requirement of an organization in the x-sector implies that ﬁrms have to
decide the design of workplaces ex ante (i.e., before production starts). This design
encompasses two dimensions: the number of workplaces and the wage structure. In
our model, they are reﬂected by two assumptions.
First, ﬁrms have to choose the amount of nonproduction (i.e., managerial) labor
that is necessary to create the desired capacity of workplaces. The nonproduction
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labor requirements in a ﬁrm increasewith the amounts of both organized high-skilled
and low-skilled production labor. It is assumed that only high-skilled labor can be
employed for the creation of workplaces.7 A natural setup for a model that reﬂects
the idea that designing workplaces is necessarily an ex ante decision is a two-stage
framework. This follows the IO literature, which hypothesizes endogenous sunk
costs for capacity investments. In our model, at stage 1, ﬁrms in the x-sector set
up workplaces under perfect foresight about the ex post situation (i.e., about both
wages and the nature of product-market competition). At stage 2 (i.e., ex post)
ﬁrms produce and supply their output on the goods market. Since the costs for
nonproduction workers to set up workplaces are sunk when ﬁrms enter stage 2,
imperfect competition in the goods market is implied. In our model, we assume
monopolistic competition among ﬁrms in the x-sector (in stage 2). In contrast, there
is perfect competition in the y-sector.
Second, ﬁrms have to choose the wage offers for the provided workplaces. It is
assumed that the provision of workplaces is accompanied by hiring activities. That
means ﬁrms announce vacancies, including wage offers. In standard models (as in
the secondary labor market in our model), this assumption is consistent with the
notion of a Walrasian auctioneer, in letting ﬁrms announce the equilibrium wage
rates. In our sunk-cost approach to workplace creation in the primary economy, the
assumption of the announcement of wage offers has to be spelled out explicitly. It
implies that wages in the primary labor market are ﬁxed at the equilibrium wage
level anticipated by ﬁrms under perfect foresight of aggregate employment levels in
the primary economy. This assumption precludes that, at production stage 2, ﬁrms
in the x-sector replace workers employed at the offered wage with workers who
underbid prevailing wage rates, i.e., no arbitrage possibilities exist ex post. Ex ante
wages can be chosen freely. Rational ﬁrms choose the anticipated equilibrium wage
structure.
Labor markets for high-skilled and low-skilled labor are segmented, where labor
supply is inelastically given by NH and NL , respectively.
Remark 1: The two-stage decision process of ﬁrms can be easily incorporated in
a (discrete-time) dynamic framework, along the lines of YOUNG [1998]. In this
framework, ﬁrms which engage in monopolistic competition in period t have to
incur setup cost in t − 1. That is, in each period t, skilled labor is allocated to
both the production process of ﬁrms that organized workplaces in t − 1 and the
organization of ﬁrms that are going to produce output in t + 1. Whereas in YOUNG
[1998] ﬁrms incur costs for product innovations, in our model ﬁrms incur setup costs
for organizing workplaces. As these sunk costs have to be incurred each period, the
decision horizon of ﬁrms is exactly one period long. This has two implications.
First, our two-stage model can be viewed as a snapshot of a dynamic model in
its steady-state equilibrium. (Young shows that there are no transitional dynamics
7 See also DAS [2001] for a model in which high-skilled workers have a double role
as production and nonproduction workers. In his model, the nonproduction activity is
speciﬁed as supervising in the presence of shirking of production workers.
Josef Falkinger and Volker Grossmann530 JITE 159
in this kind of framework, as no capital accumulation takes place.) Second, we
implicitly assume both complete turnover of workers each period and the absence
of recruitment costs.8
3.1 Technology
Output xi of ﬁrm i in the x-sector is produced according to the constant-returns-to-
scale production technology
xi = aF(hi, li) ≡ ali f(χi), χi ≡ hi/li,(1)
where hi and li denote the amounts of high-skilled and low-skilled production labor
in ﬁrm i, respectively a > 0, and f(·) is a strictly monotonic increasing and strictly
concave function that fulﬁlls the Inada conditions and f(0) = 0. Before production
starts, workplaces h¯i and l¯i for high-skilled and low-skilled labor, respectively, have
to be created. Employment in production is limited by the provided workplaces,
that is, hi ≤ h¯i and li ≤ l¯i . The organizational (nonproduction) high-skilled labor
requirement mi to create production workplaces for h¯i and l¯i production workers in
ﬁrm i is given by
mi = G(h¯i, l¯i; γ) ≡ l¯i g(χ¯i; γ), χ¯i ≡ h¯i/l¯i,(2)
where G is linear homogeneous, g(·; γ) is monotonic increasing in χ¯i , and γ is
a shift parameter. We make the convention that the effect on g of an increase in
γ is positive. Moreover, following the common hypothesis in the IO literature that
ﬁxed costs and marginal production costs are negatively related, we assume that γ
and the productivity parameter a are positively related. Then an increase in γ can
be interpreted as a kind of technological change that is associated with an increase
in total factor productivity a but rising job creation costs in the primary sector. (As
shown below, a change in a does not have an independent effect on the key variables
in equilibrium.) Abstracting from endogenous technology choice by ﬁrms,9 we
hypothesize that ﬁxed managerial labor requirements per unit of workplace capacity
have indeed increased. As argued in the introduction, such a shift is plausible as new
business computer systems have raised the demand for “managers and professionals
... [to] co-invent improvements in processes and products” (BRESNAHAN [1999,
p. F409]). Moreover, an increase in γ is consistent with increased requirements for
human resource development due to changes in skill requirements of workers (e.g.,
LLOYD-ELLIS [1999]). Note that an increase in γ is also consistent with the evidence
on white-collar employment shares reported in Table 1.
8 Note that these assumptions ensure that there are no holdup problems, which
might otherwise arise as an implication of investments in workplace capacity and
human-resource development (e.g., ﬁrm-speciﬁc training). Regarding production work-
ers, the problem does not arise, because at stage 1 ﬁrms in the primary economy post
take-it-or-leave-it wage offers to workers employed at stage 2. Nonproduction workers
only work for ﬁrms in the primary economy at stage 1, and thus cannot extract rents
from ﬁrms either.
9 See FALKINGER [2002] for an analysis of endogenous adoption of the organization
technology g.
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Production in the y-sector is unsophisticated. Low-skilled labor is the only input.
The output y of the representative unit in the y-sector is given by
y = Ly,(3)
where Ly is the employment level in the y-sector.
3.2 Preferences
There is a representative consumer, deriving utility from the consumption of the
differentiated good produced by the x-sector and the homogeneous good produced
by the y-sector. Preferences are represented by a utility function u, which is weakly
separable in these two types of goods:
u(x1, ..., xn, y) = U(X, y) = Xαy1−α,(4)
0 < α < 1, where X is a quantity index of the differentiated good given by the CES
index X = (∑i xρi )1/ρ, 0 < ρ < 1. Thus, the elasticity of demand for each variety i
produced by ﬁrm i in the x-sector is constant and given by σ ≡ 1/(1 − ρ). Denoting
the price of variety i in the x-sector by pi and the price for the homogeneous good
in the y-sector by q, we have for the optimal consumption structure
mrsi = piq , i = 1, ..., n,(5)
wheremrsi ≡ uxi /uy is themarginal rate of substitution between xi and y. (Subscripts
denote partial derivatives.)
3.3 Prices and Wages
After each ﬁrm in the x-sector has chosen the number of production workplaces h¯i
and l¯i (at stage 1; see Section 4), in stage 2 ﬁrms enter monopolistic competition.
Thus, as in DIXIT AND STIGLITZ [1977], prices are set at a (constant) markup over
marginal costs c, i.e.,
pi = µc = p,(6)
where µ ≡ σ/(σ − 1) > 1 is the markup factor.10 Denote nominal wage rates for
high-skilled and low-skilled production workers in the primary labor market by wH
and wL,x , respectively. Cost minimization implies that the relative wages wH/wL,x of
high-skilled labor and the skill intensity χi in production are related by the equation
ωx ≡ wH
wL,x
= f
′(χi)
f(χi) − χi f ′(χi)
(
= F1
F2
)
.(7)
10 The two-stage decision process of ﬁrms in the primary economy implies that sunk
nonproduction costs are not passed on to output prices. As argued above, the organiza-
tional capacity has to be determined by ﬁrms before production starts, and thus organi-
zational costs are ﬁxed costs at the production stage. See BLANCHARD AND GIAVAZZI
[2001] for a one-sector monopolistic competition model in which entry costs are pro-
portional to output like the organizational costs in our model. They also are not re-
ﬂected in output prices.
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Note that this implies χi = χ. Marginal costs are given by
c = wL,x
a [ f(χ) − χ f ′(χ)] ,(8)
according to (1) and (7). Moreover, note that at stage 2 it is optimal to utilize
capacity fully, i.e., to choose employment according to hi = h¯i and li = l¯i . Finally,
symmetry implies hi = h, li = l, and thus xi = x = l f(χ) in equilibrium. Note that
in a perfect-foresight equilibrium the installed skill intensity in production, χ¯ = h¯/l¯,
coincides with the skill intensity χ implied by the cost minimization condition (7).
Moreover, ﬁrms will not install capacity for producing output that cannot be sold.
In the y-sector we have perfect competition. This implies
q = wL,y,(9)
where wL,y denotes the nominal wage rate (for low-skilled labor) in this sector.
4 Equilibrium Number of Primary Jobs
In our two-stage framework, the perfect-foresight equilibrium is derived by back-
wards induction.
In the preceding section the (proﬁt-maximizing) behavior of ﬁrms in the x-sector
at stage 2 (i.e., for a given workplace capacity) has been analyzed. At stage 1,
ﬁrms in the x-sector choose their proﬁt-maximizing number of workplaces h¯i and l¯i ,
perfectly foreseeing the equilibrium at stage 2 (taking aggregate levels as given).
Proﬁts in ﬁrm i are earnings at stage 2 minus the nonproduction costs incurred
at stage 1. The latter are given by wHmi . Thus, the proﬁts of ﬁrm i are given by
πi = (p − c)xi − wHmi , where p is the equilibrium price determined in Section 3.3,
and xi and mi are given by the technology functions f and g, respectively.
Using (1), (2), (6), χi = χ, and the fact that all workplaces installed at stage 1
will indeed be occupied at stage 2 (i.e., hi = h¯i , li = l¯i , χ = χ¯), we can write this in
the form
πi =
[
(µ − 1)ca f(χ¯) − wHg(χ¯; γ)
]
l¯i .(10)
An equilibrium in the primary economy is reached when, under the anticipation of
the price-setting behavior of ﬁrms and the expectations of aggregate variables at
stage 2, ﬁrms have no incentive to change the structure or the amount of provided
workplaces at stage 1.
Lemma 1 (zero-proﬁt equilibrium in primary economy): There exists an equilibrium
in the primary economy inwhich ﬁrmsmake zero proﬁts and χ¯ = χ∗(γ), whereχ∗(γ)
is implicitly deﬁned by the equation
(µ − 1) f(χ¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡APL(χ¯)
= f ′(χ¯)g(χ¯; γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ACL(χ¯;γ)
.(11)
Proof: Appendix A.1.
Workplaces in the Primary Economy(2003) 533
For the intuitive understanding of the economic mechanisms behind Lemma 1,
note that (7) and (8) imply that the real wage of skilled labor (in terms of unit
cost) is given by wH/c = a f ′(χ¯). Combining this expression with (10), it is easy
to see that (11) implies both ∂πi/∂l¯i = 0 (i.e., ﬁrms have no incentive to provide
further workplaces) and πi = 0 for all i. The existence of a zero-proﬁt equilibrium
(for any given number n of ﬁrms) is an implication of the linear homogeneity
of technologies F(·) and G(·).11 Graphically, the equilibrium skill intensity χ∗(γ)
can be determined in a familiar return–cost diagram. The left-hand side of (11)
equals the “real” average proﬁt margin per low-skilled worker (in terms of unit
costs), whereas the right-hand side equals “real” average nonproduction labor costs
per low-skilled worker. (In the following we use the abbreviations APL and ACL,
respectively.) APL is an increasing function of χ¯ (starting at zero for χ¯ = 0), since
output per low-skilled worker is raised by a higher skill intensity in production. As
far as the right-hand side of (11) is concerned, a marginal increase in χ¯ has two
effects on ACL. First, the “real” wage rate for high-skilled workers, wH/c = a f ′(χ¯),
declines from inﬁnity at χ¯ = 0, lowering the average costs of organizing workplaces.
Second, the average nonproduction labor requirement g(χ¯) per low-skilled job may
increase. It is assumed that the latter effect does not outweigh the former. Thus,
ACL is a nonincreasing function of χ¯. In sum, the intersection between the APL and
ACL curves determines χ¯ = χ∗(γ) as depicted in Figure 1.
As shown in full detail in Appendix A.1, there are multiple (perfect-foresight)
equilibria in the model. First, if ﬁrms expect high wages of low-skilled production
workers, they wish to provide a high proportion of workplaces for skilled workers
so that the expansion of employment may be constrained by skilled labor supply
before the zero-proﬁt condition is reached. Second, if ﬁrms have pessimistic expecta-
tions, zero-proﬁt equilibria with unemployment of both low-skilled and high-skilled
workers result.
In order to point out that job rationing (i.e., involuntary nonemployment of low-
skilled labor in the primary labor market) is not the result of unfavorable expecta-
tions, we focus on the zero-proﬁt equilibrium with full employment of high-skilled
labor. This is the equilibrium at which employment in the primary labor market
reaches the highest possible level.12 This may be comparedwith WEITZMAN [1982],
who also analyzes a monopolistic competition model where multiple (rational ex-
pectations) equilibria exist. As in the primary labor market in our model, in his
model employment requires an organization in ﬁrms. (Unlike our model, his model
allows neither for another sector where no organization of work is necessary nor for
heterogeneity among workers.) However, in his model involuntary unemployment
11 Thus, our equilibrium concept allows for zero proﬁts of monopolistically compet-
itive ﬁrms in the x-sector, despite an exogenous number of ﬁrms n. In contrast to the
free-entry equilibrium of, e.g., DIXIT AND STIGLITZ [1977], employment levels rather
than the number of ﬁrms adjust so that proﬁts are driven to zero.
12 Of course, it is also assumed that ﬁrms in the x-sector are not constrained by the
supply of low-skilled labor. Otherwise the notion of a dual economy would not make
sense.
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Figure 1
The Skill Intensity of Production in the Primary Economy in Zero-Proﬁt Equilibrium and
the Impact of an Increase in γ
is due to pessimistic expectations. In contrast, in our model, due to its two-stage
nature, involuntary nonemployment (in the primary labor market) may occur even
with the most optimistic expectations.
The next result implies that, generally, there is indeed job rationing of low-skilled
labor L¯ x (= nl¯) in the primary economy in any zero-proﬁt equilibrium.
Proposition 1 (job rationing): In any zero-proﬁt equilibrium, the maximal equilib-
rium employment level of low-skilled labor in the primary economy, L∗x , is given
by
L∗x(NH , γ) =
NH
χ∗(γ) + g(χ∗(γ); γ) .(12)
Proof: Full employment of high-skilled labor implies H¯ + M = NH , where H¯
(= nh¯) and M (= nm) are the aggregate employment levels of high-skilled labor in
production-related and management activities, respectively. Note that H¯ = χ∗(γ)L¯ x
in equilibrium; moreover, M = L¯ x g(χ∗(γ);γ), according to (2) and χ¯ = χ∗(γ). Thus,
we have χ∗(γ)L¯ x + L¯ x g(χ∗(γ); γ) = NH , which implies (12). In zero-proﬁt equilib-
ria with less than full employment of NH , the employable level of low-skilled labor
L¯ x is clearly lower. Q.E.D.
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The maximal zero-proﬁt equilibrium employment level of low-skilled labor in the
primary labor market, L∗x , corresponds to optimistic expectations and thus to full
employment of high-skilled labor. [In a zero-proﬁt equilibrium with pessimistic
expectations we would have He instead of NH in (12), where He < NH is the
aggregate level of employment of high-skilled labor that is expected by pessimistic
ﬁrms.] As shown below, Proposition 1 implies that there is generally a wage gap
between the primary and secondary labor markets (i.e., wL,x > wL,y) in equilibrium.
(In a zero-proﬁt equilibrium wL,x = wL,y may only occur as a knife-edge case.)
Workers in the secondary labor market would like to work in the primary one.
However, ﬁrms provide no workplaces for them. Hence, they must supply their
labor to the less attractive secondary economy. As can immediately be seen from
(12), L∗x increases with NH . This reduces wage pressure in the secondary labor
market, as is discussed in Section 5.
The further analysis concentrates on the role of technological change. The notion
of skill-biased technological change played a major role in the economic literature
of the 1990s.13 However, focusing on mere changes in the production technology
has been strongly criticized (e.g., DINARDO AND PISCHKE [1997]). Changes in the
way ﬁrms organize work seem more relevant in practice. In our model, this means
that γ increases, shifting both the g-curve and thus the ACL curve upwards. This
increases the average costs of providing workplaces for low-skilled workers relative
to their proﬁt yield, implying the following.
Proposition 2 (comparative statics in the primary economy): In any zero-proﬁt
equilibrium, if γ increases, then both the equilibrium employment level of low-
skilled labor in the primary labor market (L∗x) and the relative equilibrium wage ω∗x
decline.
Proof: Apply the implicit-function theorem to condition (11) to show that χ∗ in-
creases with γ . Then use (12) and (7), respectively. Q.E.D.
Note that neither χ∗ nor L∗x depends on the number of ﬁrms n or the productivity
parameter a in the x-sector, respectively. Therefore, our comparative-static results
regarding γ apply also if a varies simultaneously with γ , i.e., if the technical and
organizational changes that make workplace provision more costly lower marginal
production costs. An increase in γ means that, for any skill intensity in produc-
tion χ, the ACL curve shifts upwards, as depicted in Figure 1. As nonproduction
13 The impact of skill-biased technological change on L∗x and ω∗x can be derived
as follows. Note that, according to (7), an increase in the relative marginal produc-
tivity F1/F2 (for any given skill intensity in production, χ) is equivalent to an in-
crease in f ′(χ)/ f(χ). Include a parameter ζ in the production function, i.e., write
f(·) = f˜ (χ; ζ), representing skill-biased technological change. Then deﬁne a function
v(χ,ζ) = f˜χ(χ;ζ)/ f˜ (χ;ζ) with vζ (χ,ζ) > 0. For the impact of ζ , rewrite (11) as µ−1= v(χ∗, ζ)g(χ∗; γ) to conﬁrm ∂χ∗/∂ζ > 0 [note that the quantity v(χ∗, ζ)g(χ∗; γ)
is decreasing in χ∗]. Thus, L∗x is decreasing in ζ , according to (12). Moreover, it
is straightforward but tedious to show that ∂ω∗x/∂ζ > 0 if and only if v(χ∗, ζ) >
gχ(χ∗; γ)/g(χ∗; γ).
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requirements for low-skilled labor rise, ﬁrms in the primary economy have a dis-
incentive to create jobs for the low-skilled. Note that, in contrast to the skill-bias
literature, wage inequality decreases rather than increases in the primary economy.
Also note that Proposition 2 holds in any zero-proﬁt equilibrium, not just in one
with full employment of high-skilled labor. We focus on optimistic expectations in
order to discuss changes in the maximal (possible) equilibrium employment level
in the primary labor market.
Also interestingly, wage inequality between skill groups in the primary labor mar-
ket (ω∗x) is not affected by an increase in high-skilled labor supply NH , according to
(7) and (11). This is due to the following opposing effects. First, as in conventional
models with a segmented labor market for different skill groups, an increased avail-
ability of high-skilled labor reduces wage inequality, given that the skill intensity in
production increases. Second, however, if NH increases, ﬁrms have an incentive to
install more workplaces which raises the demand for (high-skilled) organizational
labor. (This reduces the skill intensity in production and raises relative wages.) In
our model, the two effects exactly cancel.14 As will be seen in the next section, the
sign of the overall change in wage inequality depends on institutional barriers for
a secondary labor market.
5 Equilibrium in the Secondary Labor Market
In this section, we derive the number of secondary jobs and the equilibrium wage
differentiation for low-skilled labor between sectors.
The labor supply LSy in the secondary labor market equals the amount of low-
skilled labor that is not employed in the primary labor market, i.e.,
LSy = NL − L∗x(NH , γ).(13)
The labor demand in the y-sector, LDy , is given by goods demand in this sector,
implied by (5). In view of the fact that relative prices pi/q are related [by (6), (8),
and (9)] to marginal production costs in the primary and secondary economies, we
obtain the following characterization of LDy .
Lemma 2 (labor demand in secondary economy): The following relationship be-
tween labor demand LDy in the y-sector and the wage differential of low-skilled labor
holds:
wL,y
wL,x
= B(LDy , NH , γ) ≡
1 − α
α
· L
∗
x(NH , γ)
LDy
· µ
1 − η(χ∗(γ)) ,(14)
where η(χ) ≡ χ f ′(χ)/ f(χ) < 1.
Proof: Appendix A.2.
14 Formally, this is due to the linear homogeneity of both F(·) and G(·), which im-
plies that the (zero-proﬁt) equilibrium skill intensity χ∗ does not depend on NH . See
EGGER AND GROSSMANN [2003] for a similar result in a different context.
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B is negatively sloped in LDy , since mrs, the marginal rate of substitution between x
and y, increases in y = LDy . By contrast, the supply curve LSy in (13) is vertical. For
all wL,y/wL,x > 1 everybody would prefer to work in the secondary labor market.15
For wL,y/wL,x ≤ 1 the amount of low-skilled labor that is left over from the primary
economy does not depend on the secondary labor market. Since the number of
workplaces provided in the primary economy is limited and wages are ﬁxed at the
level offered in the announcement of vacancies, in general we have wL,x > wL,y in
equilibrium.
For the comparative-static analysis it is important to note that a cancels in (14)
because of two opposing effects. On the one hand, mrs decreases with increasing a;
on the other hand, the “real” equilibrium wage rate (wL,x/c)∗ = a[ f(χ∗) − χ∗ f ′(χ∗)]
of low-skilled labor in the primary economy [as implied by (8)] increases with a. In
sum, variations in a do not affect the relationship between labor demand and relative
wages in the secondary economy.
With ﬂexible wages, both the equilibrium number of secondary jobs (L∗y) and
the equilibrium wage for low-skilled workers in the secondary economy relative to
those in the primary economy [(wL,y/wL,x)∗] are given by the intersection of the
curves deﬁned by (13) and (14), as depicted in Figure 2. This gives us the following
result.
Lemma 3 (equilibrium in the secondary economy): Under ﬂexible wages, the equi-
librium wage for low-skilled workers relative to those in the primary economy,
(wL,y/wL,x)
∗
, and equilibrium employment in the secondary economy, L∗y, are given
by (
wL,y
wL,x
)∗
= B(NL − L∗x(NH , γ), NH , γ) ≡ b(NH , NL , γ)(15)
and L∗y = NL − L∗x(NH , γ), respectively, where (wL,y/wL,x)∗ ≤ 1 must hold in such
an equilibrium.
Proof: Directly follows from (13) and (14). Q.E.D.
Thus, under wage ﬂexibility, (wL,y/wL,x)∗ is a function of the labor supplies of both
skill groups (NH and NL ) and the shift parameter γ .16 However, there may be limits
to wage differentiation across sectors due to union power, fairness considerations
among low-skilledworkers across sectors,minimumwages, and the like.As Figure 2
reveals, if for some reason the sectorialwage gapwL,y/wL,x cannot fall belowabound
bˆ > b(NH , NL, γ) (with bˆ ≤ 1), there is unemployment of low-skilled labor. Note that
15 Of course, this can never be an equilibrium situation. Again, we refer to Appendix
A.1 for a detailed discussion of possible equilibria.
16 Substituting (12) into (13) reveals that relative employment of low-skilled labor
in the secondary labor market, L∗y/NL , is a function of relative skill supply NH/NL
and γ . The same is true for L∗x/L∗y.
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Figure 2
Equilibrium in the Secondary Labor Market
such a lower bound is equivalent to a real minimum wage for low-skilled labor.17
Clearly, if bˆ > b(NH , NL , γ), the equilibrium unemployment rate
uˆ L = 1 − Lˆ yNL(16)
is a function of bˆ, NH , NL , and γ , where Lˆ y denotes equilibrium employment level
in the y-sector in this case.
Note that the B-curve shifts upwards if NH increases, according to (12) and (14).
(Remember that χ∗ does not depend on NH .)Moreover, the LSy-curve shifts leftwards
if NH increases (or NL decreases). Thus, an increase in NH (or a decrease in NL )
softens wage pressure in the secondary labor market.
17 Formally, this can be seen as follows. Denote by Γ the aggregate price in-
dex, which should be an increasing and linear homogeneous function of the
output prices. We can write Γ = Γ˜(p, q) ≡ qβ(p/q) with β′(·) > 0. Thus, using
p = µ(wL,x/a)/[ f(χ∗) − χ∗ f ′(χ∗)] and q = wL,y, the real wage in the secondary
labor market is given by wL,y/Γ = 1/β{(wL,x/wL,y)(µ/a)/[ f(χ∗) − χ∗ f ′(χ∗)]}.
Thus, imposing wL,y/wL,x > bˆ puts a lower bound on the real wage in the y-sector.
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How is the B-curve affected by an increase in γ? Remember that an increase
in γ leads to downsizing of low-skilled labor L∗x in the primary economy, accord-
ing to Proposition 2. Such downsizing goes hand in hand with a rise in the skill
intensity χ∗ [see (12)]. Thus, according to (14), the condition that η(χ) is a non-
increasing function of χ is sufﬁcient for the B-curve not to shift upwards when γ
increases. For instance, this is fulﬁlled if f(·) is isoelastic, which implies that η(·)
is a constant. Moreover, it should be noted that our Cobb–Douglas utility speciﬁca-
tion (4), although simplifying the analysis, implies a rather strong substitutability
between output y of the secondary economy (say, cleaning services) and the differ-
entiated good (say, cars). If, for instance, instead of (4) we had assumed quasilinear
preferences, then mrs would not depend on the total output Q = nx in the primary
economy. It is easy to show that the B-curve would unambiguously shift downwards
in this case if γ increases.
Proposition 3 (comparative statics in secondary economy): Suppose the B-curve,
deﬁned in (14), does not shift up if γ increases. In any zero-proﬁt equilibrium we
have the following: (i) If wages are ﬂexible, then L∗y increases and (wL,y/wL,x)∗
decreases with increasing γ . (ii) If there is a bound bˆ > b(NH , NL, γ) on wL,y/wL,x ,
the equilibrium unemployment rate uˆ L increases with γ .
Proof: Use (12)–(16) and Proposition 2. Q.E.D.
Thus, an increase in γ is able to account for increasing labor-market segmentation,
which is revealed by both downsizing of low-skilled labor in the primary labor
market and rising wage pressure for already low-paid work in the secondary labor
market. Productivity changes in a that may accompany the variations in γ do not
affect this result.
As pointed out above, an increase in the skill supply NH shifts the B-function up,
and thus is a possible means to counteract the effect of γ towards segmentation and
rising inequality. These opposing effects of NH and γ remind one of the old debate
on the race between education and technological change (see TINBERGEN [1975]).
Also, recent discussions to promote immigration of high-skilled (“green card”) labor
can be interpreted as an attempt to accommodate technological changes. However,
the implied reduction of NH in the source countries has of course corresponding
adverse effects.
6 Conclusion
Firm-level evidence suggests that skill upgrading, computerization, and workplace
decentralization are strongly related. (For an excellent survey of this evidence,
see BRYNJOLFSSON AND HITT [2000].) Moreover, the evidence suggests that skill
upgrading in manufacturing ﬁrms is the result of downsizing of low-skilled labor,
rather than increases in high-skilled employment (e.g., BERMAN, BOUND, AND
GRICHILIS [1994]). That is, declining earning opportunities for low-skilled workers
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seem to be due to changes in methods of organizing work, rather than mere (biased)
changes in the production technology. In our model, changes in the organization of
work have a very natural place, since organization of production by nonproduction
workers is the keystone of the model.
Byusing the endogenous-sunk-cost approach from the IO literature, ourmodel has
formalized the idea that ﬁrms (in the primary economy) have to create workplaces.
We have shown that the incentive for ﬁrms to create workplaces depends on the
organizational technology. On the one hand, technical progress like computerization
and operational databases creates new possiblitites for managers and professionals
to organize production more efﬁciently, thereby raising demand for skilled, white-
collar workers. On the other hand, new methods of organization like customer
orientation or decentralized information processing and decision making require
relatively high abilities of production workers. In other words, the cost of organizing
jobs for low-skilled workers rises under new, productivity-enhancing organization
methods. This has been shown to induce ﬁrms in the primary economy to an
upgrading of the skill structure by downsizing their low-skilled work force. The
workers who are set free from the primary economy constitute an additional supply
of low-skilled workers in the secondary labor market. Typically, with ﬂexible wages
the secondary economy expands and wages for low-skilled labor go down. This is
not only consistent with the evidence of rising overall wage inequality in Anglo-
American countries, but also with the expansion of a low-paid service sector. In
contrast, with rigid wages unemployment is raised and wage inequality may even
decrease, which may be viewed as the European case.
Thus, in contrast to the one-sector models in the skill-bias literature, we can deal
with the phenomena of rising segregation, even in combination with decreases in
wage inequality. Regarding the effects of deregulation of the labormarket, the policy
implications are rather negative. Although higher wage differentiation may reduce
unemployment of low-skilled workers, it does not help to create jobs in the primary
economy. The only remedy in our framework is to increase the supply of skilled
relative to low-skilled workers.
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1 and Perfect-Foresight Equilibria
In this appendix, we prove Lemma 1 and show which kind of (perfect-foresight)
equilibria can exist in our model. Expected variables of ﬁrms in the x-sector (from
the perspective of stage 1) are denoted by superscript e. χ¯e = H¯e/L¯ex and Me =
L¯ex g(χ¯e; γ) imply He = H¯e + Me = [χ¯e + g(χ¯e; γ)]L¯ex , where He denotes aggregate
expected employment of high-skilled labor. If He = NH (He < NH ), we speak of
optimistic (pessimistic) expectations.
Given expectations χ¯e for the aggregate skill intensity in production in the pri-
mary economy, each ﬁrm expects a wage differential ωex = Λ(χ¯e), where Λ(χ¯e) ≡
f ′(χ¯e)/ [ f(χ¯e) − χ¯e f ′(χ¯e)] [use (7)]. Thus, from the perspective of stage 1, the op-
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timal (i.e., cost-minimizing) skill intensity is given by χ¯i = Λ−1(ωex) = χ¯e. Hence,
according to (10), real proﬁts (in terms of unit costs) of ﬁrm i in the x-sector from
the perspective of stage 1 can be written as
πˆi ≡ πi
c
=
[
(µ − 1)a f(χ¯e) −
(wH
c
)e
g(χ¯e; γ)
]
l¯i(A1)
= [(µ − 1) f(χ¯e) − f ′(χ¯e)g(χ¯e; γ)] al¯i .
[Note that (wH/c)e = a f ′(χ¯e), according to (7) and (8).] If the factor in square
brackets in (A1) is positive (negative), ﬁrms want to raise (reduce) l¯i and at the
same time h¯i according to h¯i/l¯i = χ¯e. If πˆi = 0 [i.e., χ¯e = χ∗(γ) deﬁned by (11) in
Lemma 1], ﬁrms have no incentive to deviate.
If χ¯e = χ∗(γ), we have
He = [χ∗(γ) + g(χ∗(γ); γ)] L¯ex ,(A2)
which relates (expected) aggregate employment levels of high-skilled and low-
skilled labor in the x-sector when proﬁts are zero. This zero-proﬁt line is depicted
in Figure A1.
Figure A1
Zero-Proﬁt Equilibrium (L∗χ, NH ) in the Primary Economy
It is easy to see that the area above the zero-proﬁt line in Figure A1 corresponds to
positive proﬁts, whereas the area below this line means negative proﬁts. Since no
ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate if πˆi = 0, any point on the line between points 0
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and A in Figure A1 can be an equilibrium. It is easy to show that there always exist
some points on the line between 0 and A where wL,y ≤ wL,x holds, i.e., there always
exists a zero-proﬁt equilibrium. This proves Lemma 1. Q.E.D.
Point A is the zero proﬁt equilibrium with full employment of high-skilled labor (i.e.,
optimistic expectations) on which we have focused in this paper. Note that points
like C, D, and E in Figure A1 cannot be equilibrium situations. At point C, the factor
in square brackets in (A1) is positive, so that ﬁrms would like to raise the number
of workplaces for both high-skilled and low-skilled labor. At points D and E, ﬁrms
want to reduce capacity. Finally, note that any situation with full employment of
high-skilled labor and nonnegative proﬁts (not just point A, but any point on the line
between B and A in Figure A1) can be a perfect-foresight equilibrium. Although at
such a point (except at A) it would be proﬁtable to raise employment levels h¯i and
l¯i along χ¯e, ﬁrms have no incentive to do so if high-skilled labor is already fully
employed. They obviously cannot expect to be able to ﬁll additional workplaces
for high-skilled workers. And deviating from χ¯e by extending l¯i alone would imply
losses, since χ¯e is the cost-minimal choice.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Substituting (6), (8), and (9), we obtain for (5)
mrsi = wL,x
wL,y
µ
a [ f(χ) − χ f ′(χ)]
(
= p
q
)
.(A3)
According to (4), for xi = x, we have uxi = α (x/y)α−1 n(α/ρ)−1 and uy =
(1 − α) (x/y)α nα/ρ. Thus, in a symmetric equilibrium in the primary economy, for
all i we have
mrsi = α1 − α
y
Q ,(A4)
where Q ≡ nx denotes total output in the primary economy. Moreover, in a sym-
metric equilibrium, li = Lx/n for all i, and thus, according to (1), Q = aLx f(χ).
Substituting this and (3) into (A4), we get
mrs = α
1 − α
Ly
aLx f(χ) .(A5)
Evaluation of (A3) and (A5) at the equilibrium values Lx = L∗x(NH ,γ) andχ = χ∗(γ)
leads to (14). Q.E.D.
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